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SO: This is Dr Sue Onslow interviewing the former New Zealand Prime 
Minister, the Rt Hon Jim Bolger in Wellington on 4th April, 2014. Sir, just 
to set this Commonwealth Oral Histories project in context: we 
originally envisaged that it would cover the period from the creation of 
the Commonwealth Secretariat in 1965, up to the Commonwealth Heads 
of Government Meeting in Perth, Australia, in 2011. However, the 
interviews now also include material and comment on the recent Sri 
Lankan heads of government meeting and the ongoing debate about the 
Headship of the Commonwealth. These interviews underline the extent 
to which the Commonwealth has evolved since 1965: the various 
changes of its Secretary General; shifts in the quality and capacity of 
the Secretariat over time; the extent to which the resources devoted to 
the Commonwealth have similarly altered; how its own grand strategies 
of the battle against apartheid and the push for development post-
independence have changed; and now the evolution of the push for 
good governance. The Commonwealth as an association and entity has 
expanded from the inter-governmental aspect of a much smaller 
organisation to one which seems to have three – if not four, pillars – 
with the continuing presence of Commonwealth professional 
organisations and the growing importance of civil society. 
JB: Well, in terms of the Commonwealth’s clarity of purpose, if you go back to the 
period when the apartheid regime in South Africa was centre stage on the 
Commonwealth agenda, there was very considerable buy-in by a great 
majority of the Commonwealth. Unfortunately, some – including the UK – 
were less than totally sure it was the right time to dismember the apartheid 
government, which they perhaps saw as serving the interests of their country 
well. In retrospect, I am sure that the countries and governments who were 
hesitant about supporting a move to genuine democratic government in South 
Africa now regret their timidity. Today, in 2014, we have different issues which 
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challenge the unity of the Commonwealth, but with that said, I am sure that 
there are many areas and many issues on which a united Commonwealth 
voice can be a powerful instrument to achieve a more just and fair world. 
 When I was Prime Minister in the 1990s, the Commonwealth was ‘modestly 
important’ – not overwhelmingly important – in shaping foreign policy. As a 
country like New Zealand moved trade more into Asia, we were dealing with 
more and more countries that don’t have Commonwealth links. Many, of 
course, have strong links to the Commonwealth because, in most cases, they 
were at one time colonies of the former British Empire. World politics and 
world trading links are in a period of rapid change, and this of course has an 
impact on New Zealand’s focus. If we go back to 1965, before Britain started 
negotiating entry into the EEC, then New Zealand’s trade focus was almost 
entirely on Britain in terms of markets. The United Kingdom is now a relatively 
minor market for New Zealand, and that change in importance has inevitably 
changed perspective. That noted, there are still important trade links and 
strong ties of kinship which means that New Zealand still takes a ‘family’ 
interest in Britain and is an active member of the Commonwealth. 
SO: So, please, could I ask, is the attraction of a continuing British 
relationship for New Zealand precisely because it’s still within the EU? 
JB: No. British membership of the EU can be beneficial to New Zealand in the 
context of having a long-time friend at the table when issues like terms of 
trade and access policies to the EU are being developed. Britain staying in 
the EU is a debate for those directly involved to decide. From my perspective, 
because the EU is Britain’s largest market, the overwhelming logic is for 
Britain to stay in the EU, but that is a decision for Britain to make. 
The historic relationship with Britain is still there, but whereas once it was the 
relationship that underpinned New Zealand’s trade and defence policies that 
is no longer the case. The scale of the change that I have been talking about 
is stark, and now China, Australia and Asia are our largest markets. Such a 
shift in interest does have significant implications in terms of focus and policy. 
Today, the Commonwealth is seen by many – and, I believe, by some 
governments – as a comfortable gathering for people who have a common 
linkage, where various issues of common interest can be raised and 
discussed. There is also an unspoken expectation that because of a broadly 
common approach, issues like, say, the rule of law will be approached from a 
common stand point. Sadly, history records that that expectation is not always 
correct. 
That may sound like damning with faint praise, but I don’t believe we should 
see it as that. I believe that my remarks are really just reflecting the world as it 
is. We are not the world that existed when the Commonwealth was first set up 
after the demise of the British Empire. So, I find nothing surprising [in] that its 
role is not as dominant in the minds of many, as it would have been in the 
beginning. 
SO: Sir, when you were elected Prime Minister, there was still the issue of 
apartheid South Africa as a unifying factor for the Commonwealth. 
Obviously, de Klerk had given his extraordinary speech to Parliament in 
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the February of that year, but the 1990-1994 period was still a very 
important period of transition in South Africa. 
JB: The de Klerk speech was extraordinarily important, as well as the manner in 
which Nelson Mandela was released and, very importantly, Mandela’s strong 
personal commitment to a peaceful transition. I first met Nelson Mandela with 
Commonwealth Secretary General Chief Anyaoku at the time of CHOGM in 
Harare, shortly after he had been released after twenty-seven years in prison. 
I maintained contact with him in various different ways since then, and I went 
to say a sad farewell to him at his funeral a few weeks back. Nelson Mandela 
was a remarkable leader and because of his approach and personal standing, 
South Africa was able to avoid the blood bath that many feared in the 
transition from the apartheid era. 
President de Klerk, having reached the conclusion that apartheid rule in 
South Africa could not continue – and that was a brave decision, because it 
was clearly not a popular with many of his party supporters – he then put in 
place some of the key elements to effect the transition from the racist era of 
apartheid to an era where all would be treated as equal before the law. 
President de Klerk’s role in the transition was hugely important, but it was the 
remarkable Nelson Mandela who was prepared to put behind him all the 
indignities he had suffered in the preceding [years] and totally commit his 
now-towering moral authority to effect a transition that was peaceful and just 
– or, as just as it could be in the circumstances of then South Africa. I know 
that many question whether sufficient progress has been made since the 
election in 1994 of the ANC-led government, and I accept that criticism, but at 
least the evil of treating people differently because of the colour of their skin is 
gone. 
The real question from a Commonwealth perspective is did the 
Commonwealth do enough to support the new government of South Africa? I 
believe that the role the Commonwealth played in the lead up to the transition 
was a very positive and supportive one, and the Commonwealth’s active 
involvement in the debate on the way forward helped to trigger the de Klerk 
speech. It was the ‘road to Damascus’-type speech that was essential to 
break the deadlock, and I believe that Commonwealth activism helped in the 
process. 
SO: How clearly do you recall the discussion and debate at that Harare 
CHOGM? Because that, of course, is where the Harare Declaration on 
good governance – the Commonwealth’s ongoing grand strategy to 
support democracy and its institutions – was articulated and decided. I 
understand Chief Emeka also used that meeting as a springboard to go 
down to South Africa to offer Commonwealth assistance in every way, 
shape or form to transition. 
JB: There was, I believe, the hope – if not universal expectation – that the Harare 
Declaration on good governance would provide an underpinning not only for 
South Africa, where they’d still had to have general and local elections at that 
stage, but also to many other countries in the Commonwealth, notably our 
then host country, Zimbabwe. [There was hope] that they would also pick up 
and understand the dynamics of good governance and introduce them. It is 
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sad but true that that hasn’t always happened. So, I believe the Harare 
Declaration was a very useful document in setting out what the 
Commonwealth expected, or what it hoped, was the approach that would 
guide Commonwealth countries. 
If you jump forward to the 1995 CHOGM in New Zealand, which had 
President Mandela at the table as South Africa had rejoined the 
Commonwealth, we saw the Harare Declaration invoked to justify suspending 
Nigeria from the Commonwealth. Recall that while leaders were in session at 
the Millbrook Resort, Nigeria murdered nine environmental activists – Ken 
Saro-Wiwa and eight others. After intense debate, led by myself, we 
suspended Nigeria from the Commonwealth. One of the pillars underpinning 
the argument to suspend was, in fact, the Harare Declaration. I also 
remember saying to the gathering from the Chair that, “If the actions of the 
Nigerian Government were acceptable inside the Commonwealth, then I for 
one didn’t know that I wanted to be inside the Commonwealth.” If 
Commonwealth leaders were going to allow that sort of judicial killing to go 
on, because leaders or countries didn’t like people taking an activist role and 
pointing out the errors of the government’s policy, then what value did the 
Commonwealth have? 
Although most were in agreement in the debate at Millbrook, there were two 
countries which I knew would be uncomfortable with the concept of an 
organization like the Commonwealth looking behind a nation’s borders and 
making judgments on various actions. We knew that both Zimbabwe and 
Malaysia would find the concept of making judgments on internal actions 
difficult to accept. So, the question was how do we persuade President 
Mugabe and Prime Minister Mahathir to accept the suspension of Nigeria? 
From both leaders’ perspective, it was a question of retaining the absolute 
sovereign right to make decisions affecting their own countries. 
To achieve the decision I knew [that] the great majority of leaders wanted, I 
asked President Mandela to work on persuading President Mugabe and I 
would work to persuade Prime Minister Mahathir. Of course, many others also 
played a part in helping to achieve the result I believed was necessary to 
retain the status of the Commonwealth, and in the end, all agreed and we got 
the consensus resolution that you’re familiar with. So, did the Commonwealth 
play a positive role in this space? Absolutely. 
SO: At that time, the Director of Information at the Commonwealth 
Secretariat was Michael Fathers, himself a New Zealand national. He has 
suggested to me that, in fact, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and Dr 
Mahathir of Malaysia had been two pillars of the Commonwealth for 
Chief Emeka Anyaoku as Secretary General. Yet here you are outlining 
their relatively dated version of the absolute sovereignty of independent 
states. 
JB: Clearly from their perspective it was not a dated version. What I’m telling you 
is exactly what happened. You’ve got to remember the discussions I had with 
President Mandela – he was new at the Commonwealth meeting – and me as 
Chair inviting him to work alongside me to persuade President Mugabe and 
so get his agreement on the way forward. I didn’t want a split. I wanted a 
consensus that we should suspend Nigeria, and I said I would also work with 
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Dr Mahathir with the same objective in mind. The record shows that we 
achieved a consensus and Nigeria was suspended. 
SO: I’m just remarking about the public face of consensus, when actually 
there was an amount of private dissent and discussion. Isn’t there a 
certain paradox there? 
JB: Often public and private faces are different. 
SO: Oh, yes! Such is the game of politics. So, in drafting the Millbrook 
Declaration, did you rely on your own staff and your own drafting to 
craft that particular declaration, or was the Secretariat very much 
involved? 
JB: My staff would have been working with the Commonwealth Secretariat staff – 
plus Chief Anyaoku – and would have had a significant input. The Harare 
Declaration was, in my view, quite specific on what was expected of 
governments and clearly the actions of the Nigerian Government were far 
outside the norms of good government. 
The reference back to Harare was used to good effect and confirms the 
importance of setting out principles at the appropriate time. That said, the 
Commonwealth hasn’t acted – to the best of my knowledge – on other 
egregious actions by some members of the Commonwealth. Failure in the 
past to take action surely can’t be used to excuse unacceptable action in the 
future, and that was clearly an approach that I adopted. 
SO: So, as the host government, you had a particular influence at the 1995 
CHOGM – not simply at Auckland, but also at the Retreat. How much of 
the emergence of the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group was also 
the product of your own intellectual ideas? That was an integral part of 
Commonwealth oversight: to help correct ‘serious and persistent 
violations’. 
JB: Well, it was certainly consistent with my thinking. The Commonwealth, as a 
gathering of about fifty countries, does not have the opportunity or the time to 
distill its thinking on challenging and complex issues. A smaller group will 
have greater focus on issues, and therefore you have a better chance of 
making progress. It was certainly my hope that this is what would happen. 
SO: Did you already have a targeted group in mind? Or did you hope that 
this would emerge at the Retreat? 
JB:   You always have the names of key players in mind, but of course it seldom 
works out exactly as you might anticipate because it’s not a single, dictatorial 
decision. What you need is to have the skills to be able to guide the 
discussion towards who can contribute in this sort of environment. 
SO:  In addition to the enormous moral authority of Nelson Mandela as the 
quintessential former political dissident and now head of state, did you 
have other key heads who you hoped would be particularly supportive? 
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JB: I only knew three leaders that could be, in my judgment, challenging in terms 
of the Commonwealth response to Nigeria’s actions. The third one was Jerry 
John Rawlings of Ghana. He’s an interesting leader who I’ve met many times, 
in Commonwealth [meetings] and in another organisation. He is always 
somewhat unpredictable in terms of the outcome at the end of his 
interventions, but I took the view that he would come down on the right side. 
Though he would wander widely – which he did precisely – [he] did come 
down on the right side of the argument, for which I was grateful. With the 
other two, we had put in far more work to achieve the outcome we sought. 
SO: Yes. You were still Prime Minister for the Edinburgh Commonwealth 
Heads of Government Meeting in 1997? 
JB: I was. I was asked to depart after I returned from Edinburgh. 
SO: Please, if I could ask you, Sir, while you were still Prime Minister, what 
was your view of Edinburgh as a review meeting on the implementation 
and progress of the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group in the two 
year intervening period? 
JB: Good question. The Edinburgh conference clearly had the imprint of the then 
British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, who was a consensus operator, and 
perhaps he had a high level of hope that the way he structured the gathering 
would lead to a sensible way forward. I’ve never asked myself this question 
since then, but from this distance, I would say that there was substantial 
continuation from Harare/Auckland/Edinburgh in terms of the commitment to 
the concept that good governance was an underpinning, component part of 
what was expected of Commonwealth membership. 
SO: As I mentioned at the start of the interview, the Commonwealth was 
itself evolving during the 1990s – with the growing role and voice of civil 
society, the dramatic changes in the structure of the international 
system following the end of the Cold War, and the end of apartheid in 
South Africa. The Commonwealth is unusual in the high degree of 
access that civil society leaders have to the Commonwealth heads. 
Heads could argue that they are the democratically-elected and so have 
the mandate of the people, rather than these unelected members of 
NGOs. How far do you think that this shift in the Commonwealth has 
been problematic in diluting that clarity that you made reference to at 
the start of our discussion? 
JB: It’s easy to have clarity if you have one big obnoxious issue, like apartheid, 
which – with some qualifications – everybody could easily sign up and say, 
“This is wrong. This has to change.” We are now into a period where the 
world is much more complex and multi-faceted, and clarity on how the 
extraordinary issues the world faces today are dealt with is much more 
complex. Something that’s hit the papers again this last weekend is the inter-
governmental panel report on climate change, which is a terrifying read for 
anybody who reads it with their eyes open. Now, a small percentage of the 
Commonwealth will read it with eyes open. A small percentage will read it 
with, “Well, yes, but this is a bit overblown and we don’t have to do anything 
tomorrow,” and another percentage will read and say, “Yes, we’ve heard all 
this before, but it really is not something we need to bother ourselves with. 
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We’re a high, mountainous country.” So, when you’re dealing with climate 
change as compared with apartheid, you will inevitably have a much more 
graduated level of views. From those who say the clarity of the report means 
that the report really has to be accepted, the report builds on earlier reports, 
but there will still be a response along the lines of, “We must do something”, 
to, “Well, not yet,” and to, “Maybe we don’t ever have to do it.” 
 So, getting a policy commitment that can be implemented or be seen to be 
implemented is much more challenging with this sort of global issue. That’s a 
challenge for the Commonwealth: is it going to be relevant in dealing with an 
issue as big as climate change? Every country, as far as I can see, has a 
different take on what it needs to do, and therefore how will a common 
position emerge? I was in Bangladesh recently, and Bangladesh is one of the 
most densely populated countries in the world. It’s got 30-40 million people on 
its huge delta. If the climate change report proves to be accurate and sea 
levels rise as predicted, they’ll have 30-40 million refugees inside their own 
country – their own people. That concentrates their mind dramatically. 
Already some rice paddies have been converted into shrimp farms. 
In Bhutan, where I also was recently, climate change relates to how much 
snow is on the mountains and how much ice is in the glaciers, and therefore 
how much water will be in their rivers next spring and summer. It’s broadly the 
same issue in Nepal. So, no country is in a space where they don’t have to 
factor in the implications of climate change on the scale that was talked about 
in the report, but the urgency to respond is less in some than others. That’s 
just three countries where I happen to have been in recently, but you could go 
right around the Commonwealth and get similar examples – right across the 
board. 
SO: Sir, I know your recent tour has been concerned with canvassing 
support for New Zealand’s election to the United Nations Security 
Council. In the 1990s, New Zealand was also looking to secure its place 
on the Security Council. To what extent did you and your Foreign 
Minister Don McKinnon try to use the Commonwealth as a particular 
vehicle to secure this policy goal? 
JB: It was certainly a bond between the countries that we lobbied in 1990 and it is 
likewise today. It doesn’t guarantee [that] x number of countries are going to 
support you, but it’s one of the links that is important in a campaign for a 
position on the Security Council. I’m sure our Australian cousins did the same 
when they were elected to the Security Council a couple of years back. But to 
then answer the second half of that question, the Commonwealth has to have 
much more than that [bond] to sustain itself as a viable organization. Being 
able to call on fellow Commonwealth members in a campaign is what I would 
describe as a valuable ‘add-on’ to being a member of the Commonwealth. 
SO: So, the Commonwealth then becomes part of your ‘toolbox’ for foreign 
policy? 
JB: Yes, in that terrible terminology! But yes, certainly. 
SO: Exactly. Is it ‘smart power’? 
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JB: Well, it’s intelligent. Who do you ask other than your friends, or those who 
understand you best, if you want to do something? In broad terms, the 
Commonwealth will be high up in that group. 
SO: During your seven years as Prime Minister, how important was the 
Commonwealth compared to other key components of New Zealand 
foreign policy? There was the continued anti-nuclear policy that you 
had here in New Zealand, the relationship with the United States and 
Australia, [and] the push towards East Asia and China, particularly on 
trade relations. I know this list seems to suggest that the 
Commonwealth came relatively low down the list of priorities, or is that 
a misrepresentation? 
JB: It’s an over-statement. A simple way of putting it is that there was never a 
discussion where we said, “We won’t bother about the Commonwealth 
because they’re no longer of great relevance and therefore we should 
concentrate on, say, the US and China.” Of all of the relationship issues that 
we have, you picked up one of the more challenging, and that was New 
Zealand’s anti-nuclear stance. That policy was, of course, not a universal 
Commonwealth position. Our close friends, the Australians, were strongly 
opposed to the policy at that stage. The British were strongly opposed to the 
policy at that stage, and there were many other voices in the Commonwealth 
that disagreed with New Zealand. There were a number of Commonwealth 
countries who were in support of our policy, but we couldn’t just rely on the 
Commonwealth’s voice. 
We, of course, explained to Commonwealth members and to the wider world 
why New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy was a rational and sensible policy that 
the world should adopt. One of the remarkable things – and I’m not sure how 
much input individual Commonwealth country members made – is that now, 
across the world, there is in a much higher level of unanimity on this issue. 
There should be no nuclear testing, an issue we had huge arguments about 
down in this part of the world – to stop nuclear testing in the Pacific. We were 
successful, and so now the world has moved very substantially in the 
direction that New Zealand led. 
 Now, we led in defiance of many senior Commonwealth members who 
thought the policy was wrong. I’m pleased to say that many now agree with 
the policy. So, the Commonwealth itself was probably less influential in 
crafting anti-nuclear policies than we might have hoped. For example New 
Zealand put together the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, working with a 
range of countries to do that – many were in the Commonwealth, some were 
not. The Commonwealth can have a valuable input into foreign policy in the 
sense of saying, “What’s the Commonwealth’s view on [this] issue?” But of 
course the answer was often mixed. 
SO: To what extent did you identify the Commonwealth as being a valuable 
forum for small states in the 1990s? You made reference to the Pacific – 
the South Pacific Forum and the Pacific Island Forum. 
JB: Small countries need to gather together for strength or to have their voice 
heard, so to the extent that they can join themselves into a group like the 
Commonwealth – the Pacific Forum you noted is a smaller version – of 
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course that is hugely important. A country of fifteen or twenty-five or three 
hundred thousand people would have no individual voice of substance, but 
together they can attract attention. 
SO: For example, at last count, there were 10,700 members of Tuvalu. 
JB: So, a small states group is essential to add weight to issues that are 
important to them. The central core of every organisation is that you gain 
greater strength by collaboration than you do as an individual. That’s the 
reason why people join organisations of the like-minded. So, looking at the 
Commonwealth, the like-minded come essentially from the British colonial 
influence. For countries like Mozambique, who joined the Commonwealth [in 
the] 1990s, there is no such connection. 
SO: Well, indeed. There was a serious discussion on Mozambique but an 
even more intense debate on Rwanda’s application to join. Neither of 
these countries are culturally or historically linked to a wide British 
world. 
JB: Correct. They may, in some way, feel a cultural link, but historically they’re 
not. Culturally only in the sense that they are in geographic proximity to other 
Commonwealth countries, and that influenced the decision that they could 
join. Which raises the question – which you are exploring – [of] whither does 
the Commonwealth go next? Clearly, the legacy of the British Empire – which 
then morphed into the Commonwealth – was very influential, and may have 
been even dictatorial in the early stages of the Commonwealth, but the further 
we move away from that era, the bigger the questions become. “Where to 
now?” 
SO: Could it be said that New Zealand took a particularly strong stance on 
small state issues? For example, New Zealand tried to contribute to the 
resolution of conflict on the Bougainville issue in the 1990s, during your 
Premiership. Was this in a Commonwealth context or was this a 
specifically bilateral approach? 
JB: It was overwhelmingly bilateral, but obviously we worked with other ‘like-
minded’ [countries], to use Foreign Affairs terminology. A country the size of 
New Zealand, within the broad arc of our neighbourhood, can have a 
significant influence as a small country with a good reputation. You add to 
that influence if you’re working with other like-minded in the same space. But 
New Zealand did ‘step up’, if that’s the phrase, and put its mind to that issue. 
SO: Indeed. On another multi-lateral issue, it’s been noted that the 
Commonwealth doesn’t get the credit for its contribution to the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries Initiative on debt relief. Can I ask you about 
this, or was this something in which you didn’t take a particular 
interest? 
JB: Most of that happened after I left, but Don McKinnon – who I know was active 
in that space during his term as Secretary General – will fill you in on the 
details of that, I’m sure. 
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SO: Yes. I’ll press him further on that one when I see him again later this 
week. 
JB: Again, this was the emerging issue for the Commonwealth at that time. HIPC 
was a big issue – a defining issue – for a number of small Commonwealth 
countries, and therefore getting the focus needed required the leadership of 
the Commonwealth. To achieve results it requires committed leadership and 
energy, rather than rely [on] a bland declaration from a heads of government 
meeting. 
SO: Well, indeed. Your description of ‘bland declarations’ suggests you 
don’t put much weight on such pronouncements, but focus on the 
question of how you achieve results. 
JB: The best that the heads of government can do is to identify – with as much 
clarity as possible and with as much force as possible – the issue that needs 
to be addressed in an effort to move an issue forward. But Prime Ministers 
then all go back home to their busy schedules, and they rely almost entirely 
on their own foreign policy experts and ministries. Of course, implementing 
policy as identified by heads of government is the core role of the Secretariat. 
SO: Please, could I ask your view on the question of the personal chemistry 
between heads? When the Commonwealth was in an earlier incarnation, 
it was a much smaller association. The innovation of the Retreat at the 
Ottawa Conference in 1973 was thought to be an extraordinarily 
valuable adjunct to international diplomacy, because the informality and 
close contact as well as possibilities of personal chemistry helped to 
establish bonds of trust. Was that as applicable, in your experience, in 
the 1990s? 
JB: Yes, because it was at the Retreat that we dealt with the Nigerian question. If 
it hadn’t been for that environment, I doubt whether we’d have achieved the 
consensus necessary to take action, which was a very high level action, to 
suspend a country’s membership of the Commonwealth. 
SO: And the speed of the decision, as well? 
JB: And speedy. The Nigerian delegation left the room immediately and bought a 
lot of golfing gear and played golf at Millbrook. 
SO: I think the diplomacy of golf is much underrated! 
JB: I’ve never played it myself. The pro shop was probably quite happy to sell the 
gear! I believe that the Retreat gathering of heads of government is very 
important and an essential part of CHOGM. Of course, there are some staff 
around, but the atmosphere is different and that’s important. I can’t speak for 
the last couple of heads’ meetings because I haven’t been there, but in the 
1990s it certainly was a valuable consensus-building, trust-building 
arrangement. 
SO: And also from the point of view of exchanging ideas globally? 
Obviously, there has been an acceleration and proliferation of 
international organizations, and there is a multiplicity of international 
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meetings now. In fact, heads seem just to bounce from international 
meeting to international meeting. 
JB: The number of meetings creates its own problem. Inevitably, the next heads 
of government meeting will – as they did last time and probably the time 
before – spend an enormous amount of energy and time on global financial 
matters. I saw the IMF today saying that if we, the world, are not careful, the 
recession – ‘sub-par growth’, they call it now, you’ve got to get your 
terminology right – is going to continue. 
SO: Yes, I was reading Christine Lagarde’s speech at the School of 
Advanced International Studies on Wednesday [2 April 2014]) and her 
description of the risks of a ‘low growth trap’. 
JB: ‘Sub-par growth’ will continue for years. So, it’s inevitable that’ll be center 
stage when the heads meet. 
SO: Is the Commonwealth the appropriate forum to discuss this, or is it just 
a useful sounding board? 
JB: Although the Commonwealth is clearly not in a decision-making position, the 
benefit of such discussions will be to compare notes and improve your 
understanding of what’s happening in other countries. The fact that they are 
all in the Commonwealth is not as material as that they’re all talking about an 
issue so as to better understand it. 
SO: Please, Sir, if I could ask you a slightly loaded question… What is your 
particular view of the attributes and the value of Secretary General Chief 
Emeka – who was an international servant – compared to the 
subsequent Secretary General from New Zealand, who was much more 
of a politician, in enhancing the role and influence of the 
Commonwealth through that office? 
JB: It’s very hard to judge, to be perfectly honest, because I wasn’t a 
Commonwealth leader when Don McKinnon was the Secretary General. I 
have heard nothing but positives about his capacity to reach out to people, 
and he is renowned for his skills to reach people and to persuade them. For 
example, some of that came through when we were both at Nelson Mandela’s 
funeral. I noticed as I was talking to President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan, 
Don McKinnon was talking to his African colleagues and the interaction, you 
could see, was very positive. Chief Anyaoku was a more reserved person. His 
background was more reserved than that of a senior politician who, for many 
years, had been his country’s Foreign Minister. To be perfectly honest, I don’t 
think we can generalize. They will all be different – that’s inevitable. The 
question could be asked as to whether there are benefits in having someone 
with a political background as Secretary General, since they’re dealing with 
politicians. The answer, all things being equal, is probably yes, if you get the 
right person. But the wrong politician, of course, would be the worst choice. 
SO: Indeed. So, please, can I just ask your particular view of the role of the 
contribution of the Queen as Head of the Commonwealth? 
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JB: The Queen’s role as Head of the Commonwealth is, of course, complex. She 
is the Head of State of a small number of the Commonwealth countries and 
she is the titular head of the Commonwealth. In the latter role, she is a highly 
respected person, but consistent with her role as the Monarch of a number of 
countries she doesn’t interfere in the discussions or decision-making. At the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings, she seeks to meet all the 
heads of government in attendance and she engages with them on all 
manner of issues. Because she’s got such wonderful, long-lived genes, she’s 
been around for a long time and knows many of the leaders and most of their 
counties as well. 
SO: She may live as long as her mother. 
JB: Well, I think there’s every probability that, with modern medicine, [she will live] 
a little longer. My mother and the Queen Mother were of the same age, but 
my mother lasted another couple of years, so I’m going to stay around and 
annoy people for a long time! At least that is what I threaten them. 
All that said, the Queen’s role is substantially a symbolic one, reaching back 
to the era of the British Empire, with no mandated power at all but a 
persuasive off-the-stage capacity if she chooses to use it. I imagine that’s 
been used more than once, but you and I won’t hear about it. She is quite 
remarkable, and I say that as New Zealand’s leading Republican. She’s quite 
a remarkable woman, and it’s not conceivable to me that she is therefore not 
contributing. She will be contributing, but it will be in her own way. She 
doesn’t deliver a speech that says the leaders should do this or that on, say, 
climate change. That’s not her role. 
SO: Yes. As for the Commonwealth going forward, how do you account for 
its survival? To what extent do you predict its continued existence and 
longevity? 
JB: That’s a very interesting question: survival. The fact that non-traditional 
Commonwealth [countries], or countries with little Commonwealth links, want 
to join is interesting. So, there is something within the organisation that 
attracts countries like Rwanda and Mozambique, but doesn’t attract others 
that could seek to join because of historic connections. Technically, Ireland 
would clearly qualify as the British were there for a long time. The Americans 
could apply, as could Israel on similar grounds. 
SO: Indeed, and so could an independent Palestine. 
JB: Yes, and that’s what I mean when I observe that other countries, in theory, 
could apply to join. Israel and an independent Palestine, if that emerges, 
could apply to join. So, we have some countries who could come in and don’t, 
and some countries that have historically had little by way of British 
connections who have joined. I tease people occasionally that if the historic 
British connection is weakened, then the Commonwealth could become just a 
mini-United Nations. 
SO: I understand Yasser Arafat made mention – probably half-jocularly – 
that he might join the Commonwealth. 
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JB: I hadn’t ever heard of that, but I did say at some meeting at the 
Commonwealth behind closed doors, “Why don’t we invite all these countries 
in?” Get the US in, for that would be good in terms of profile. The Irish might 
want to re-litigate the past and that could cause a bit of fight. I think if we 
brought in both the Israelis and the Palestinians they might actually talk to 
each other. It changed some of the focus of the discussion when, in a light 
hearted manner, I suggested some of this. 
SO: I was going to ask, was this ‘light blue touch paper and stand back’? 
JB: That’s right! Sometimes it helps to take people out of their comfort zone. I 
don’t know if there are any other countries lining up to join. So, your question 
was, “What underpins its longevity?” It has lasted a long time, and it can only 
be because governments, through many changes of Heads – there’s been 
Prime Minister after Prime Minister in all the countries – have clearly seen 
value in joining together once every second year and discussing world issues. 
That’s what really is the core of the business, and their attendance means 
that they see the Commonwealth as a valuable forum in which to conduct 
such discussions. 
You could ask why they can’t have these discussions at the UN or some other 
international gathering. Frankly, I don’t have a good answer to that question, 
other than there is more engagement by leaders at Commonwealth meetings 
than at the UN. And sometimes it’s hard to stop an organisation that’s started 
and is functioning and meets a need. 
SO: Indeed. It exists, so heads use it. Did you ever have a sense that the 
Commonwealth’s success was precisely because it did operate 
relatively ‘below the radar’, and that its invisibility was one of its unseen 
strengths? 
JB: If that means that it doesn’t attract the critics to the same extent, because its 
head is not above the parapet – like, say the UN – and hopefully it is doing 
worthwhile things, then I believe that is helpful. The CHOGM held in Sri Lanka 
was, I believe, the last time when critics saw something they thought was 
wrong and should be addressed. South Africa and apartheid was the other 
big issue where critics rose up in great numbers and asked the question, 
“What is the Commonwealth doing to bring an end to the evils of apartheid?” 
At this point, critics seem to believe that the Commonwealth has the capacity 
to change a member country’s policy that the critics find objectionable. The 
Commonwealth doesn’t have that authority, but it can and does put issues 
into the public arena in a manner that helps bring change about. So, there is 
an expectation that something can happen. The leaders can support that 
expectation but they can’t impose a different solution. 
SO: So, from the Harare Declaration, followed by the Millbrook Declaration 
and the Latimer House Principles, the Commonwealth has evolved and 
is evolving very much more to a values-based association, with a 
Charter, measurements and sanctions, and declared commitments to 
human rights. In your view, does this become more problematic for 
countries that joined the Commonwealth before there were these yard 
sticks of good governance? 
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JB: If what you’re saying is that if the Commonwealth became more intrusive, 
then the willingness of countries to submit themselves to that intrusion would 
be challenged more frequently, I am sure that there would be more 
challenges. Some countries might be tempted to withdraw and say, in effect, 
“We don’t accept that degree of intrusion.” That is why the Millbrook decision, 
in terms of dealing with a very difficult issue, was pivotal in terms of the 
modern Commonwealth. At Millbrook, we were able to reach an agreement 
on something that was terribly sensitive to both the region and to the largest 
country in the region and it was successful. 
SO: And, of course, the behavior of the Abacha regime was enormously 
problematic to the Nigerian Secretary General. 
JB: Yes, and to be fair to him, he managed the issue really well. 
SO: Indeed, and by the end of his second term of office, Nigeria had – 
through the fortuitous death of General Abacha – been welcomed back 
into the councils of the Commonwealth. 
JB: Yes. We’ve had South Africa and Nigeria both out of the Commonwealth and 
back in again. The details of the reasons were different, but essentially the 
issues concerned basic human rights. 
SO: Well, maybe Fiji will be following that trajectory. 
JB: You’re right. Fiji has been in the news again. You will have seen over the last 
48 hours or so that New Zealand and Australia have removed many of the 
sanctions against Fiji in the expectation that they were moving in the right 
direction and were committed to restoring democracy. I find no fault with that. 
If the path forward continues, as clearly governments in both countries 
believe it will, then that’s all good news. 
SO: But Zimbabwe poses a rather greater challenge? 
JB; Zimbabwe poses a huge challenge. Ironically, I was watching BBC before I 
came to do the interview and who appears on the screen looking very fit and 
well but President Mugabe. 
SO: Well, indeed. Perhaps he may live as long as the Queen Mother! 
JB: Without question, [it’s] possible. Looking out further, I believe [that] as we 
move into more socially sensitive areas, the challenge to find consensus will 
be more demanding. There’s a growing concern across most countries – and 
certainly among the NGO community – that the growing disparity between the 
‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’, to use that old term, must be addressed. This 
issue will be a real test for the Commonwealth, given that the different political 
structures in member countries will mean achieving a consensus on what 
policy mix to promote or endorse; [this] will test both skills and patience. That 
said, the issue can’t be ignored, and of course it is a worldwide issue – not 
just a Commonwealth issue. It is emerging as one of the big issues in the 
world. Nobody really believes that the present trajectory, where the number 
who control most of the world’s wealth gets smaller every week, is 
sustainable long-term. In my view, this issue is going to be one of the great 
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challenges for big international organisations like the Commonwealth, which 
over the years has put a focus on social issues in member countries. 
SO: Yes. My previous interviewee, Chris Laidlaw, was saying that the 
Commonwealth as a pioneering organisation faces one of its greatest 
challenges in the problem of global inequality. 
JB: Well, it appears that Chris and I are saying the same thing from different sides 
of the page. That doesn’t surprise me, to be perfectly honest, because I 
believe it’s the world’s challenge. It came out about seven weeks back that 
185 individuals own or control wealth equal to that owned by the bottom 3.5 
billion world citizens.  
SO: I find that morally repugnant. 
JB: To me, it’s obnoxious beyond belief. The wealth disparity is increasing every 
day, or put the other way, the numbers that own the bulk of the world’s wealth 
are decreasing every day. There is madness abroad in this space. 
SO: So, those who argue that the Commonwealth really doesn’t matter – 
because it doesn’t have hard power capability, it has no influence, no 
leverage on the big issues – do they, in fact, fundamentally 
misunderstand its latent strengths and its benefits? 
JB: I believe that is correct. It would be very easy to say, “Well, what has it done?” 
and, “Let’s call it quits.” That would be a very simple thing to do. The more 
challenging option is to say [that] the organisation exists and it has a very 
wide and very diverse membership – in terms of geographical spread, in 
terms of ethnicity, in terms of wealth distribution – so how can we harness this 
diversity to address some of these big world issues? My answer is that the 
Commonwealth must confront these issues and then concentrate on making 
progress one step at a time. 
SO: So, that’s not just the leadership of the Secretary General, it is also the 
leadership of key heads? 
JB: Absolutely. If the key heads won’t get in behind this agenda, then it won’t 
happen. It will require some head or heads to step up and lead. Someone has 
to step up and lead, and normally that means being prepared to be 
controversial in the minds of some. New Zealand is normally prepared to take 
a leadership role, even if issues like ‘nuclear free’ are controversial. To have 
ongoing relevance, the Commonwealth must be prepared to open up 
discussion on big issues and confront whatever opposition or controversy 
such action might entail. If that doesn’t happen, then more and more will say, 
“Why bother?” The mood will turn negative and more will say, “Well, why are 
we bothering with this organisation?” 
SO: Indeed. Sir, thank you very much indeed. 
 
  [END OF AUDIOFILE] 
